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Structured abstract 
Objective: The present research addresses the question how trust in systems is formed when 
unequivocal information about system accuracy and reliability is absent, and focuses on the interaction 
of indirect information (others’ evaluations) and direct (experiential) information stemming from the 
interaction process. 
Background: Trust in decision-supporting technology, such as route planners, is important for 
satisfactory user interactions. Little is known, however, about trust formation in the absence of 
outcome feedback, i.e. when users have not yet had opportunity to verify actual outcomes.  
Method: Three experiments manipulated others’ evaluations (“endorsement cues”) and various 
forms of experience-based information (“process feedback”) in interactions with a route planner, and 
measured resulting trust using rating scales and credits staked on the outcome. Subsequently, an 
overall analysis was conducted. 
Results: Study 1 showed that effectiveness of endorsement cues on trust is moderated by mere 
process feedback. In Study 2, consistent (i.e., non-random) process feedback overruled the effect of 
endorsement cues on trust, whereas inconsistent process feedback did not. Study 3 showed that while 
the effects of consistent and inconsistent process feedback largely remained regardless of face validity, 
high face validity in process feedback caused higher trust than those with low face validity. An overall 
analysis confirmed these findings.  
Conclusion: Experiential information impacts trust even if outcome feedback is not available, and, 
moreover, overrules indirect trust cues – depending on the nature of the former. 
Application: Designing systems so that they allow novice users to make inferences about their 
inner workings may foster initial trust. 
 
Keywords: system trust; process feedback; outcome feedback; consistency; face validity 
 
Précis: System outcomes have been found to impact user trust. Less is known about trust formation 
when users cannot verify actual outcomes. Experiential information derived from the interaction 
2 
process impacts trust even if outcome feedback is absent, and overrules indirect trust cues – depending 
on whether the former appears consistent or random. 
Assessing Technology In The Absence Of Proof: Trust Based On The Interplay Of Others’ 1 
Opinions And The Interaction Process 2 
Trust is generally acknowledged to play an important role in our interactions with technology, such 3 
as process automation, online applications, or consumer electronics. As with interpersonal trust, 4 
meaningful interaction requires sufficient levels of trust to enable reductions of uncertainty regarding 5 
the functioning of this particular system and its capabilities. Hence, the concept of system trust is 6 
crucial in understanding how people interact with systems, an idea that has firmly taken root in 7 
research in this field (for instance, see Halpin, Johnson, & Thornberry, 1973; Lee & Moray, 1992; Lee 8 
& See, 2004; Merritt, 2011; Muir, 1988; Sheridan & Hennessy, 1984; Verberne, Ham, & Midden, 9 
2012; Zuboff, 1988). 10 
Arguably, the antecedents of system trust depend, at least to some extent, on the degree of 11 
experience of the user. Someone who is experienced in using an online route planner, for instance, 12 
may base a trust judgement on his or her experiential information in terms of interaction outcomes, 13 
i.e., how often the system has provided advice that turned out to be correct. To the inexperienced user, 14 
the opinions and recommendations of others about a system are probably the easiest source of trust-15 
relevant information, and, as such, they are influential in the user’s decision to start using it (De Vries 16 
& Midden, 2008). As will be argued in the following sections, however, users may also gain direct 17 
experience even though actual outcome feedback is not available to them, for instance by simply test-18 
running the application.  19 
When it comes to direct experience (or direct information), the crucial distinction made in this 20 
paper is between outcome feedback and process feedback, or, in short, between feedback obtained 21 
from trying and testing a system and from test-running it. The availability of outcome feedback allows 22 
users to either verify a system’s solutions or advice in terms of good or bad, or to decide to what 23 
extent they are satisfied with the provided advice. They may purchase an item online, and assess 24 
whether delivery was in conformance with what was promised beforehand. Similarly, a user may 25 
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follow a route planner’s driving directions and arrive at a particular final destination, and subsequently 26 
assess whether the suggested route’s duration was indeed one hour and 35 minutes and whether traffic 27 
jams were successfully avoided. Process feedback, on the other hand, is used here to denote any kind 28 
of direct interaction in the absence of outcome feedback. Thus, people may try an online bookseller by 29 
entering a query for a particular book, adding the book to the shopping basket, acquiring information 30 
about shipping and handling costs, but stop the interaction before the deal is actually closed and 31 
outcome feedback may become available. Similarly, people seeking routing advice may try out a route 32 
planner by entering a few destinations and see what the system's suggestions will be without actually 33 
driving them. Thus, they actually engage in direct interaction with the application, even though 34 
outcome feedback is not yet available to them; after all, this would only be available after actually 35 
driving the suggested routes. Information obtained from process feedback does not necessarily have 36 
anything to do with actual algorithms and functions employed by the system (such as cost functions 37 
used by route planners to calculate routes) but is the result of the users’ information processing based 38 
on the cues provided to them via a system’s interface displays. 39 
Recently there has been a marked increase in attention for other, more subtle trust cues in human-40 
system interaction than outcome feedback, such as goal similarity (Verberne, Ham, & Midden, 2012) 41 
and cues conveying transparency and system rationale (e.g., De Visser et al. 2014; Helldin et al., 42 
2013; Ososky et al., 2014; Thill, Hemeren, & Nilsson, 2014). Nevertheless, the effects on trust of 43 
direct experiences in the absence of outcome feedback have, to our knowledge, not received any 44 
attention in human factors research. The question central to this paper, therefore, is whether and how 45 
such direct experiences influence trust when feedback on the outcomes is absent, and how these 46 
interact with indirect information such as concurrently available recommendations of others. 47 
Antecedents Of System Trust 48 
System trust is defined here as a user’s expectation about the system, that it will perform a certain 49 
task that is beneficial for the user, in a situation in which a lack of sufficient evidence causes the actual 50 
outcome of that task to be uncertain. It effectively limits the vast number of possible future interaction 51 
outcomes to only a relatively small number of expectations, thus reducing perceptions of both 52 
uncertainty and risk of the actor (Luhmann, 1979; cf. Giddens, 1990). Luhmann (1979) furthermore 53 
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argued that trust should be seen as part of a continuous feedback loop that indicates whether or not 54 
trust is justified. More specifically, there is an object at which trust is directed, the referee or trustee, 55 
and this object provides feedback in terms of behaviour on the basis of which trust might be built up or 56 
broken down (cf. Lee & See, 2004). So, a system’s behaviour may be watched by the user to see 57 
whether trust placed in it was justified. If the system performs according to the user’s positive 58 
expectations trust may be maintained or increased; not living up to expectations will result in a 59 
breakdown of trust, possibly to the extent that trust is replaced by distrust. Luhmann’s feedback loop 60 
emphasises the role of positive and negative interaction outcomes, i.e. direct information. These, 61 
however, are not available to novice users, who may have to rely on indirect information instead. 62 
The effects of indirect information such as recommendations on trust have been studied in such 63 
diverse fields as consumer behaviour (Formisano, Olshavsky, and Tapp, 1982), reputation 64 
management (Standifird, 2001, Jensen, Davis, and Farnham, 2002), and web site credibility (Fogg and 65 
Tseng, 1999, Fogg et al., 2001, Briggs, Burford, De Angeli, and Lynch, 2002), and it has been found 66 
to be of particular importance to trust in initial relationships (e.g., see McKnight, 2002; McKnight, 67 
1998). System trust research, however, has largely neglected the role of indirect information (for an 68 
exception, see De Vries & Midden, 2008), and instead focusses on the build-up of trust as a function 69 
of personal experience over prolonged experimental trials. Typically, the focal system produces 70 
varying numbers of output errors, such as under- or overheating of juice or milk in a pasteurisation 71 
plant (Lee & Moray, 1994; Muir, 1989) or the incorrect classification of characters as either letters or 72 
digits (Riley, 1996), which are subsequently shown to influence trust and reliance on automation (also 73 
see De Vries, Midden, & Bouwhuis, 2003). 74 
Such unequivocal output errors, however, may not be the only trust-relevant information obtainable 75 
from direct experience. Woods, Roth, and Bennett (1987), for instance, found that when technicians 76 
do not trust a decision aid, they either reject its solution to a problem or try to manipulate the output 77 
toward their own preconceived solutions. In their study, they found evidence that technicians, working 78 
with a system designed to diagnose faults in an electromagnetic device and suggest repairs, sometimes 79 
simply judged themselves whether the system's pending advice was likely to solve the problem, rather 80 
than implementing the suggested change and subsequently checking whether it provided the desired 81 
5 
results. In other words, these technicians apparently did not wait until unequivocal right/wrong 82 
feedback became available to them to form a trust judgement, but rather followed their own 83 
judgements on the plausibility of the system's "line of reasoning" as it was fed back to them. 84 
Apparently, people sometimes judge the quality of system advice on the process that led to that advice. 85 
Similarly, Lee and Moray (1992) argued that besides automation reliability, also "process" should 86 
be considered as a trust component of direct experiences. Process denotes an understanding of the 87 
system's underlying functions or characteristics, such as the rules or algorithms that determine how the 88 
system behaves. As such, it bears resemblance to mental models, referring to representations that 89 
capture the workings or structure of a device (Sebrechts, Marsh, & Furstenburg, 1987). As such, they 90 
represent knowledge of how a system works, what components it consists of, how these are related, 91 
what the internal processes are, and how they affect components (Carroll & Olson, 1988). Mental 92 
models allow users to explain why a particular action produces specific results; however, they may be 93 
incomplete or internally inconsistent (Allen, 1997). 94 
Such understanding of a system’s inner workings may be facilitated by the degree of consistency of 95 
process feedback on which it is based. Analogous to interpersonal trust models, which hold that 96 
individuals are inferred to be dependable after they have consistently displayed instances of reliable 97 
behaviour (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985), so too does making inferences about internal processes 98 
probably depend on consistency of system behaviour. Users may conclude there is a reason for the 99 
system's process feedback to show a particular recurring pattern. For example, a user may request a 100 
route planner’s advice on a number of different routes and subsequently notice that it persists in 101 
favouring routes that use a ring road over those that take a shortcut through the city centre. The user 102 
might then start conjecturing what causes this evident preference, and may, for instance, infer that the 103 
system may discard shortcuts through the centre because it is prone to dense traffic. Regardless of 104 
whether it actually matches the system's actual decision rules, this insight in the system's inner 105 
workings, comparable to, for instance, Zuboff's (1988) "understanding", Lee and Moray's (1992) 106 
"process", and Rempel et al.'s (1985) "dependability", may reduce the user's uncertainty, and, thus, 107 
lead to a greater willingness to rely on the system's advice. Indeed, research by Dzindolet, Peterson, 108 
Pomranky, Pierce, and Beck (2003) has shown that participants working with a "contrast detector" to 109 
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find camouflaged soldiers in terrain slides, trusted the system more, and were more likely to rely on its 110 
advice when they knew why the decision aid might sometimes fail, compared to those who were 111 
ignorant of such causes. 112 
Although Dzindolet et al.'s (2003) studies provide additional, empirical support for the idea that a 113 
sense of understanding is beneficial for trust, their participants did not obtain this information from 114 
their own direct experiences with the device, as both Lee and Moray's (1992) concept of "process" and 115 
mental model theory entails, but rather obtained it from the experimenter. As such, the assumption that 116 
users form such beliefs by observing system behaviour remains untested. 117 
Combined effects of indirect and direct information 118 
Normally, users probably have multiple concurrent types of information available to help them 119 
form a trust judgement about a particular system; besides their own experiences, based on process and 120 
outcome feedback, they may also resort to the opinions of others. Like accumulated prior experience 121 
with a system, such indirect information may influence users’ perceptions of the system, and, hence, 122 
trust and automation use (cf. Merritt & Ilgen, 2008). Potentially important in this regard is the impact 123 
of both sources of information. Direct experiences have been argued to be more informative than 124 
indirect ones, and have been shown to lead to more robust attitudes (e.g., see Regan & Fazio, 1977). 125 
For the same reason, they have been argued to have a stronger influence on trust formation than 126 
indirect information (Arion, Numan, Pitariu, & Jorna, 1994). Congruously, Yuliver-Gavish (2011) 127 
showed that experiential information about a decision support system's performance had a stronger 128 
impact on users’ reliance on the system than did descriptive information. 129 
Arguably, whether or not direct experiences are superior to indirect experiences depends on the 130 
actual amount of information derived from these experiences. When a system's process feedback is 131 
consistent, in that it displays stable preferences or patterns, this will allow users to generate a line of 132 
reasoning to explain the regularities. This type of feedback could therefore be considered as highly 133 
informative, and, as such, may be capable of overriding the influence of the less informative 134 
recommendations. Contrarily, inconsistent feedback may contain far less information that will be 135 
instrumental in the formation of such beliefs. As such, the information it conveys may not be 136 
substantial enough to override the effect of competing recommendations. 137 
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The current research 138 
This section describes the results of three consecutive experiments and an overall analysis. All 139 
three experiments revolved around participants’ interaction with a number of supposedly different 140 
route planners. The procedures for each off these experiments were largely identical; only the visual 141 
feedback about planned routes varied. 142 
Outline of the studies 143 
Study 1, a pilot study, was conducted to establish the influence of mere process feedback; 144 
specifically, we tested whether there would be a difference in the effect of with endorsement cues on 145 
system trust depending on presence or absence of process feedback, i.e. whether or not the generated 146 
routes would be visualised. Study 2 was designed to test the interaction of endorsement cues with a 147 
specific characteristics of process feedback, viz. its consistency; the set of routes displayed in Study 1 148 
were adapted and supplemented to create a more homogenous set on the one hand and a set with a 149 
more jumbled appearance on the other. Specifically, in one condition, a stable preference for arterial 150 
roads or highways was displayed, whereas in the other routes were selected randomly from a subset of 151 
different routes. Study 3 aimed to partly replicate the findings of study 2 and simultaneously to extend 152 
it by disentangling the effect of consistency from that of face validity. In other words, this study tested 153 
the effect of consistency when the routes generated were high in face validity (as they were in Study 2) 154 
compared to when they were not, i.e. when they were unconvincing route options. Finally, Study 4 155 
was conducted to further bolster the claim that user-system interaction provides trust-relevant 156 
information despite the absence of verifiable outcome feedback, an overall analysis was conducted 157 
combining the various manipulations in the three experiments, allowing us to assess the validity of the 158 
focal point with far greater statistical power. 159 
Overall methodology 160 
In all three experiments participants were seated behind a PC, where they were informed that they 161 
would participate in research concerning the way people deal with complex systems. Specifically, they 162 
would have to interact with four different route planners capable of determining an optimal route by 163 
estimating the effects of a vast number of factors, ranging from simple ones, like obstructions and one-164 
way roads, to more complex ones, such as (rush-hour) traffic patterns. Furthermore, they were told 165 
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that the computer had a database at its disposal, containing route information based on the reported 166 
long-time city traffic experiences of ambulance personnel and policemen from that city. These 167 
experiences supposedly constituted a reliable set of optimal routes, against which in principle both 168 
manually and automatically planned routes could be compared and subsequently scored; however, in 169 
these experiments only automatic route planning was enabled. As such, only the route planning 170 
capability of the machine was validated; the result of this validation, however, was fed back to 171 
participants only after completion of the entire experiment. 172 
During the experiments, a map was shown on the screen (see Figure 1); participants were not 173 
informed that it was based on the map of London. Using this map, participants were requested to 174 
perform a professional route dispatcher’s task by sending quickest possible routes to waiting cars, the 175 
current location and destination of which were indicated on the screen. The route-planning phase 176 
 
Figure 1. Route planner interface 
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consisted of 5 trials with each of the four route planners; by clicking the “Automatic”-button the route-177 
generating process was started. The automatically generated routes appeared on the screen in an 178 
incremental fashion, i.e. by drawing lines from each crossing to the next; the exact nature of the 179 
displayed routes varied between experiments and Process Feedback conditions. Finally, after the route 180 
had been generated the “Accept Route” button would become active; by clicking it the “dispatcher” 181 
supposedly sent the routing advice.  182 
In all three experiments participants received information about the endorsement of the system by 183 
participants in a recent pilot test, and for each route planner this was either manipulated to be high or 184 
low (Endorsement Cue). Specifically, before actual interacting with each of the four route planners, 185 
high Endorsement Cue participants learned that a majority were extremely satisfied. In the low 186 
Endorsement Cue condition, participants were told that this was a minority. As all participants 187 
encountered both the low and high Endorsement Cues twice, two slightly different percentage figures 188 
were randomly used to convey high endorsement (“more than 83%” or “app. 88%”), and two for low 189 
endorsement (“less than 17%” or “app. 12%”). 190 
We assumed participants would be more committed to the task if a certain risk were to be 191 
associated with their choices. Thus, we designed the experiment so that they were allotted ten credits 192 
per route-planning trial, which, either entirely or partially, could be put at stake. Directly after a 193 
route’s starting point and finish were indicated on the map, a dialogue box would appear on the screen, 194 
asking participants to enter any number of the allotted ten credits as stakes. The actual automatic route 195 
generation commenced immediately after they had entered this number. When an automatically 196 
generated route, after supposed comparison with the database with reported routes, was judged slower, 197 
participants would lose the credits they had staked on this particular route; a quicker route resulted in a 198 
doubling of the staked credits. Participants’ total number of credits would be revealed after interaction 199 
with all four route planners, and they were told that the money they would receive would depend on 200 
this total. However, as the program gave only bogus feedback, all participants were rewarded equally 201 
for their participation (€ 3. -, approximately US$ 3.50). Besides committing participants to their task, 202 
the number of credits that participants staked on the outcome of the automatic route-planning mode 203 
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was considered a reflection of their trust in the system, with few staked credits indicating low trust, 204 
and many credits implying high trust (analogous to Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995).  205 
Both before and after interaction with each route planner, participants were required to rate the 206 
extent to which they trusted the system (7-point scales, ranging from “very little” (1.) to “very much” 207 
(7.)). Thus, we obtained self-reports of system trust, in addition to the measure of trust derived from 208 
the staking of credits. 209 
In none of the studies outcome feedback, i.e., clear feedback in terms of a particular route being 210 
either successful or not, was made available to participants during interaction with the route planners.  211 
Study 1 (pilot): Cue Effectiveness And Mere Process Feedback 212 
Method. 213 
Twenty-four undergraduate students (10 F, 14 M, Mage = 20.96, SD = 1.76, range = 18 - 24 y) 214 
participated in this study. The experiment had a 2 (Endorsement Cue: low versus high) * 2 (Process 215 
Feedback: present versus absent) within-participants full-factorial design. 216 
In this study, participants were told that all route planners would generate routes but that some of 217 
them would and others would not actually visually present them (i.e., the Process Feedback present 218 
and Process Feedback absent conditions, respectively). Nevertheless, they were requested to stake 219 
credits and to accept each of these routes when the system indicated completion, i.e., when the “accept 220 
route” button would become active. The routes generated in the Process Feedback present condition 221 
were obtained in earlier experiments (reported in De Vries & Midden, 2008; De Vries, Midden & 222 
Bouwhuis, 2003), where participants could also manually plan routes. These manually planned routes 223 
were logged in a data file, from which the most commonly planned routes were selected to be used in 224 
this experiment. Thus, each presented route was deemed realistic by previous participants. 225 
 226 
Results. 227 
No effects were found for the order in which participants received the manipulations. Therefore, 228 
this variable will not be included in the subsequent analyses. 229 
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Before- and after-interaction trust measures. 230 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was run with the trust ratings as dependent variable, and 231 
Endorsement Cue, Process Feedback, and Time of measurement (i.e., before versus after interaction) 232 
as independent variables. Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 1. 233 
Table 1 
Average ratings of system trust, taken before and after interaction on 7-point scales, and 
standard deviations as a function of Endorsement Cue and Process Feedback; higher 
scores indicate higher levels of trust
 Trust Measure 
 Before  After 
 Process Feedback  Process Feedback 
 Present  Absent  Present  Absent 
Endorsement Cue M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Low 3.25 1.59  3.04 1.63  3.29 1.60  3.46 1.72 
High 5.21 0.93  5.38 0.82  4.88 1.16  4.29 1.49 
 234 
Both Endorsement Cue and Time of measurement produced (marginally) significant main effects, 235 
(F (1, 23) = 38.4; p < .01, and F (1, 23) = 3.6; p < .08, respectively). Process Feedback and the 236 
interaction between Endorsement Cue and Process Feedback did not yield significant effects, Fs < 1. 237 
Endorsement Cue and Time of measurement, however, appeared to interact, F (1, 23) = 11.1; p < 238 
.01; the effect of the former was largest in the before-interaction measurements. 239 
More interestingly, a significant three-way interaction between Endorsement Cue, Process 240 
Feedback and Time of measurement was found, F (1, 23) = 6.0; p < .03 (see Figure 2). 241 
 
Figure 2. Average ratings of system trust, taken before and after interaction on 7-point scales, as 
a function of Endorsement Cue and Process Feedback; higher scores indicate higher levels of 
trust 
Follow-up analyses showed that when Process Feedback was absent, Endorsement Cue and Time 242 
of measurement interacted significantly, F (1, 23) = 18.8; p < .01, indicating that the effect of 243 
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Endorsement Cue after interaction was less pronounced than before. When Process Feedback had been 244 
present, however, this interaction was non-significant, F < 1. 245 
Staked credits. 246 
The average number of credits staked was subjected to a repeated-measures ANOVA with 247 
Endorsement Cue and Process Feedback as independent variables. This analysis revealed a significant 248 
effect of Endorsement Cue, F (1, 23) = 7.2, p < .02 (sphericity assumed), indicating that participants 249 
had entered fewer credits in trials preceded by a low endorsement cue than in trials preceded a high 250 
endorsement cue. However, no significant effects of Process Feedback, or of an interaction were 251 
found, F (1, 23) = 2.3, ns., and F (1, 23) < 1. Results are shown in Table 2. 252 
Table 2 
Average number of staked credits and standard deviations as a 
function of Endorsement Cue and Process Feedback 
 Process Feedback 
 Present  Absent 
  M SD  M SD 
Endorsement Cue Low 3.93 2.30  4.78 2.64 High 5.38 2.41  5.68 2.45 
 253 
The correlation between the number of credits staked and ratings of system trust was marginally 254 
significant, r = .37, p < .08. 255 
Discussion. 256 
The mere availability of process feedback proved to affect trust. The results showed that when no 257 
process feedback was given, the after-interaction trust measurements were less influenced by 258 
endorsement cues than before-interaction measurements. When process feedback was present, no such 259 
interaction was found. Whereas the former might be explained by the wearing-out of cue effectiveness 260 
over time, the latter could have been caused by the apparent randomness of the displayed routes. 261 
Somewhat jumbled visual information may have been difficult to interpret, and, thus, participants may 262 
have had to resort to cue content to support interpretation. This explanation would imply that less 263 
jumbled, i.e. more consistent process feedback would not invoke the need for cues for interpretation, 264 
as it may provide information, thus overruling rather than sustaining endorsement cue effects. This 265 
will be tested in Study 2.  266 
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Study 2: Cue Effectiveness And Process Feedback Consistency 267 
This experiment was conducted to study the effects of endorsement information in combination 268 
with consistent versus inconsistent route generation. 269 
Presumably, when a system's feedback is consistent, it may enable users to generate beliefs about 270 
the system's workings that explain the regularities. As such, consistent process feedback could be 271 
considered to convey information. Contrarily, inconsistent process feedback may not convey such 272 
information. Consequently, consistency in the routes displayed on-screen while interacting with the 273 
route planner was expected to increase trust, whereas the absence of consistency, i.e., randomness, 274 
would have no such effect. In fact, as inconsistent process feedback may be interpreted as system 275 
inadequacy, it could be expected that an additional decrease in trust ratings would be found. 276 
In the absence of process feedback, endorsement cues were expected to be used to form trust, as 277 
would become evident from the before-interaction trust measures. With the availability of process 278 
feedback, however, the information in the endorsement cue would have to compete with the 279 
information provided by process feedback. The process feedback characteristics would, therefore, 280 
determine what would happen to cue effectiveness. Specifically, the information conveyed by 281 
consistent process feedback was expected to override the influence of the competing, less informative 282 
endorsement cue on the after-interaction measures. The little information obtained from inconsistent 283 
process feedback, however, may not be substantial enough to override the effect of competing 284 
endorsement information. Consequently, when an inconsistent process determines the displayed route, 285 
the effect of an endorsement manipulation could be expected to be sustained over time, rather than 286 
overruled. 287 
Method. 288 
Thirty-two students participated in this study (6 F, 26 M, Mage = 22.06, SD = 1.81, range = 18 - 26 289 
y). The experiment had a 2 (Endorsement Cue: low versus high) * 2 (Process Feedback: consistent 290 
versus inconsistent) within-participants full-factorial design. 291 
In this study, the routes in both Process Feedback conditions were based on those used in study 1 292 
and those in the log file with manually planned routes in earlier experiments (see De Vries & Midden, 293 
2008; De Vries, Midden & Bouwhuis, 2003). This was done to keep face validity, i.e. the degree to 294 
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which the routes were convincing as fastest routes or preferable in the eyes of participants, equal 295 
between the two conditions. For the consistent Process Feedback condition routes were selected that 296 
predominantly favoured arterial roads. Subsequently, sets of five different route alternatives were 297 
created for each combination of start and finish point; in the inconsistent Process Feedback condition 298 
the automatically generated route was randomly drawn from this set. As a result, routes in the 299 
Consistent Process Feedback condition took "red" roads, i.e. arterial roads or highways, in 80% of the 300 
cases, and deviated from the red routes in only 20 %. In the Inconsistent Process Feedback condition, 301 
the randomly selected roads either followed a red road in 20 % of the cases, whereas in the remaining 302 
80 % a more-or-less straight line between start and finish or any other reasonably probable route was 303 
followed. 304 
The manipulation checks required participants rate the extent to which (a) they could predict the 305 
generated routes, (b) they thought the generated routes displayed a certain pattern, (c) they thought 306 
that the generated routes were based on fixed rules, and (d) the generated routes matched the way they 307 
themselves would have planned them. 308 
Results. 309 
No effects were found for the order in which participants received the manipulations. This variable 310 
will, therefore, not be included in the subsequent analyses. 311 
Manipulation checks. 312 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs with Endorsement Cue and Process Feedback as independent 313 
variables showed that in the consistent Process Feedback condition (as opposed to the inconsistent 314 
condition) participants rated a higher ability to predict route generation, F (1, 31) = 44.3; p < .01, a 315 
greater extent to which they had discerned a certain pattern, F (1, 31) = 22.8; p < .01, a stronger belief 316 
that fixed rules were the basis for the generated routes, F (1, 31) = 15.3; p < .01, and a greater 317 
similarity of automatically generated routes with the way they themselves would have planned them, F 318 
(1, 31) = 8.3; p < .01. No effects of Consensus, nor of an interaction of Consensus and Process 319 
Feedback were found on any of these checks, all Fs ≤ 1.3; ns. The Process Feedback manipulation 320 
therefore proved successful. 321 
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Before- and after-interaction trust measures. 322 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed, with Endorsement Cue, Process Feedback and Time 323 
of measurement (before- versus after-interaction) as independent variables. (See Table 3 for means 324 
and standard deviations). 325 
Table 3 
Average ratings of system trust, taken before and after interaction on 7-point scales, 
and standard deviations as a function of Endorsement Cue and Process Feedback; 
higher scores indicate higher levels of trust 
 Trust Measure 
 Before  After 
 Process Feedback  Process Feedback 
 Consistent  Inconsistent  Consistent  Inconsistent 
Endorsement Cue M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Low 3.34 1.07  3.47 1.05  4.25 1.02  3.19 1.65 
High 5.31 0.82  5.09 1.00  4.53 1.41  4.13 1.41 
 326 
Several significant main effects were found. Trust was significantly higher after a high 327 
Endorsement Cue than after a low Endorsement Cue, F (1, 31) = 38.1; p < .01.; additionally, 328 
consistent Process Feedback resulted in higher trust than inconsistent Process Feedback, F (1, 31) = 329 
6.7; p < .02. Time of measurement also yielded a significant overall effect on trust, F (1, 31) = 4.4; p < 330 
.05; overall, trust levels tended to decrease over time. No interaction between Endorsement Cue and 331 
Process Feedback was found, F (1, 31) = 0.4, ns. 332 
The effect of Endorsement Cue was more pronounced on the before-interaction than on the after-333 
interaction measure, as indicated by a significant interaction of Endorsement Cue and Time of 334 
measurement, F (1, 31) = 17.5; p < .01. Moreover, a significant three-way interaction between Process 335 
Feedback, Endorsement Cue and Time of measurement, F (1, 31) = 4.4; p < .04 was found. This 336 
interaction is visualised in Figure 3. 337 
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Figure 3. Average ratings of system trust, taken before and after interaction on 7-point scales, 
as a function of Endorsement Cue and Process Feedback; higher scores indicate higher 
levels of trust 
Follow-up analyses were conducted to test the specific hypotheses pertaining to this three-way 338 
interaction. When Process Feedback was random, before- and after-interaction measures were both 339 
significantly affected by the Endorsement Cue manipulation, F (1, 31) = 47.2; p < .01, and F (1, 31) = 340 
5.72; p < .03, respectively; as can be seen in Table 3, trust ratings were significantly higher following 341 
a high Endorsement Cue than they were after a low Endorsement Cue. In the Consistent Process 342 
Feedback condition, a highly significant interaction of Endorsement Cue and Time of measurement 343 
was found, F (1, 31) = 25.5; p < .01, indicating that the Endorsement Cue manipulations only had an 344 
effect on the before-interaction trust measurement (F (1, 31) = 63.1; p < .01), but not on the after-345 
interaction measurement (F (1, 31) = 0.9; ns.).  346 
These analyses therefore provided support for the hypothesis that inconsistent Process Feedback 347 
caused the Endorsement Cue effect to be sustained over time, whereas consistent Process Feedback 348 
overruled the effect of Endorsement Cue. 349 
Staked credits. 350 
The number of stakes entered showed a significant effect of Endorsement Cue, F (1, 31) = 5.3; p < 351 
.03. A high Endorsement Cue caused participants to stake more credits than a low Endorsement Cue. 352 
Process Feedback did not produce a significant effect, F < 1, ns. The interaction between Endorsement 353 
Cue and Process Feedback was not significant at the 0.05-level, F (1, 31) = 3.1, p = .09. See Table 4. 354 
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The ratings of system trust and the average number of staked credits correlated significantly, r = 355 
.37, p < .04. 356 
Table 4 
Average number of staked credits and standard deviations 
as a function of Endorsement Cue and Process Feedback 
 Process Feedback 
 Consistent  Inconsistent 
Endorsement Cue M SD  M SD 
Low 5.00 2.17  5.18 2.25 
High 5.98 1.67  5.48 1.97 
 357 
Discussion. 358 
The data showed that the differences in trust between high and low endorsement treatments hardly 359 
changed over time when process feedback was of a rather random nature, an indication that 360 
inconsistent process feedback provided little additional information that competed with endorsement 361 
information. In addition, participants may also have used the endorsement information to interpret the 362 
ambiguous randomised information presented on the screen. In the consistent process feedback 363 
treatments a different pattern emerged. Although endorsement information influenced participants’ 364 
before interaction trust levels, this effect could not be shown for the after-interaction measure, which 365 
was in line with the hypotheses. 366 
Both the trust measures and the credits staked were influenced by the endorsement information. 367 
Contrary to the trust measures, however, the credits did not show a reduction in this effect as a result 368 
of consistent process feedback. An explanation for this marked difference could lie in differences in 369 
“exposure duration” between endorsement cues and process feedback manipulations. The former was 370 
administered before participants started their interaction with each route planner, and, thus, could well 371 
have affected the credits staked in the all trials, including the first few. How consistent or inconsistent 372 
its process feedback was, on the other hand, could only be assessed after at least a few, and perhaps all 373 
five trials. Consequently, the effect of process feedback may simply not have been strong enough to 374 
manifest itself in the average over all five trials.  375 
 376 
This experiment showed that the character of the process feedback plays a significant role in the 377 
formation of trust. One explanation for this finding, suggested previously, is that, contrary to 378 
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randomness, consistency tempts users to think that there is a reason why the route planner results 379 
showed a particular recurrent pattern, rather than consider the pattern as an imperfection of the system. 380 
In other words, users may form beliefs about the system's functioning in order to explain its output. 381 
This, in turn, may increase trust and, subsequently, the willingness to rely on generated route 382 
solutions. The findings that the effect of endorsement information depended on the consistent versus 383 
inconsistent appearance of the suggested routes, and that participants were more convinced that there 384 
were fixed rules embedded in the route planners that gave consistent process feedback than those with 385 
inconsistent process feedback, provides additional support for this contention. 386 
Study 3: Process Feedback Consistency And Face Validity 387 
Arguably, consistency alone may not provide sufficient grounds for trust to form; users may also 388 
base their judgement on face validity. Indeed, one may think of a system yielding output that consists 389 
of consistent yet unlikely, or disagreeable advice. Being based on manually planned routes in earlier 390 
studies the consistent and inconsistent process feedback likely consisted of rather agreeable routing 391 
advice; the question remains what the influence of consistency will be when the routes displayed are 392 
highly unlikely as correct solutions, i.e., when routes are low in face validity and users are not likely to 393 
agree with the advice given to them. 394 
Lerch and Prietula (1989) investigated agreement with human and system advice, and confidence 395 
in the source of this advice. They treated participants' agreement with system advice as similar to 396 
predictability, and proposed an additive model of confidence and agreement. Agreement ratings, like 397 
predictability ratings, were primarily guided by the specific evidence provided in each problem 398 
solving trial; confidence levels were to a certain extent based upon prior confidence levels and on an 399 
agreement history. By considering agreement similar to consistency, Lerch and Prietula implied that 400 
both concepts have a similar direct relation to trust. Higher agreement with system advice corresponds 401 
to higher levels of trust, as would be the case for consistency. 402 
Face validity, or agreement, in Lerch and Prietula's (1989) terminology, and consistency in process 403 
feedback come about differently, however. Face validity of system advice, i.e., the extent to which 404 
people regard the advice as realistic, convincing, or preferable, may be based on one single route-405 
planning trial; contrarily, conclusions concerning the degree of consistency can only be drawn after 406 
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viewing multiple different routes. In other words, to a novice user, an assessment of face validity may 407 
be made before process feedback is judged as consistent. Furthermore, consistency does not 408 
necessarily imply that users agree with it. For example, if a user wants advice on how to travel from, 409 
say, the Royal Albert Hall to Piccadilly Circus, and subsequently from Piccadilly Circus to Tower 410 
Bridge, a route planner that consistently incorporates the distant Hyde Park in its suggestions is not 411 
very likely to instil trust in the user, and is probably not considered to provide feedback high in face 412 
validity. Therefore, consistency and face validity can be considered as separate characteristics of 413 
process feedback, and they will be treated accordingly in this study. 414 
 415 
In Study 3, face validity of process feedback was pitted against process feedback consistency and 416 
endorsement cues. Similar to Study 2, consistent feedback was expected to result in higher trust 417 
ratings than inconsistent feedback. Likewise, process feedback with high face validity, i.e., process 418 
feedback that participants believe is likely to result in fast routes, would cause trust ratings to be 419 
higher than process feedback with low face validity, i.e., that is unlikely to yield fast routes. 420 
Additionally, as consistent process feedback may contain trust-relevant information, it was expected to 421 
overrule the effect of endorsement information, causing the effect of endorsement on the after-422 
interaction trust measures to disappear. Inconsistent process feedback, being low in informational 423 
content, would not be able to overrule endorsement information, as would be indicated by a sustained 424 
endorsement effect on after-interaction trust over time. 425 
As a result of the overruled endorsement effect, trust levels in the consistent conditions would show 426 
a convergence over time, as was observed in Study 2; whether trust levels would converge on high or 427 
low after-interaction trust levels, was expected to depend on face validity. Specifically, consistent 428 
process feedback with high face validity was expected to converge at higher trust levels than 429 
consistent process feedback with low face validity. Inconsistent process feedback was expected to 430 
show a sustained effect of endorsement on the after-interaction measure, in addition to an effect of 431 
face validity: inconsistent process feedback with high face validity would result in higher after-432 
interaction trust than inconsistent process feedback with low face validity. 433 
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Method. 434 
Participants and design. 435 
Forty-eight undergraduate students participated in this study (9 F, 39 M, Mage = 21.69, SD = 1.81, 436 
range = 18 - 29 y), which had three-factor mixed design (full-factorial). Endorsement Cue (low versus 437 
high) was varied between-participants, whereas Consistency (consistent versus random) and Face 438 
Validity (high versus low) were manipulated within-participants. The order in which the Face Validity 439 
conditions were encountered constituted an additional two-levels between-participants variable. 440 
Procedure. 441 
Process feedback that was Consistent and had High Face Validity consisted of routes that favoured 442 
arterial roads, and, as such, were similar to the routes used in the consistent process feedback 443 
condition of Study 2. Likewise, routes displayed in the Inconsistent and High Face Validity conditions 444 
were the same as those used as inconsistent routes in the previous experiment, and showed routes 445 
selected randomly from a small subset of alternatives that participants had preferred in earlier 446 
experiments. Contrarily, the routes in the Low Face Validity condition, both Consistent and 447 
Inconsistent, were entirely different to the routes used before. Low Face Validity entailed routes that 448 
displayed relatively large detours; these routes, therefore, were not very likely to be as fast as required. 449 
Process feedback that was Consistent and had Low Face Validity showed routes that made a relatively 450 
large detour that was always on the same location; thus, these routes were both unlikely to be fast, but 451 
at the same time displayed consistency. Contrarily, process feedback that was Inconsistent and had 452 
Low Face Validity consisted of routes that made relatively large and inconsistent detours, i.e., never 453 
on the same spot. 454 
The order in which these manipulations took place was counterbalanced. The first two route 455 
planners yielded Consistent process feedback, whereas the third and fourth were random, and vice 456 
versa. Within the Consistent and Inconsistent conditions, High and Low Face Validity conditions were 457 
systematically varied. 458 
The manipulation checks concerning Face Validity entailed asking participants to rate the extent to 459 
which (a) the generated routes matched the way they themselves would have planned them, and (b) 460 
they agreed with the displayed routes. Consistency manipulations were checked by having participants 461 
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rate the extent to which they (a) could predict the generated routes, (b) thought the generated routes 462 
displayed a certain pattern, and (c) thought that the generated routes were based on fixed rules. 463 
Results. 464 
The order in which manipulations in process feedback were encountered, proved to influence some 465 
dependent variables. The variable Order was, therefore, included in all reported analyses as an extra 466 
independent variable; as such, the reported effects are corrected for order effects. As no specific 467 
hypotheses regarding order effects have been formulated, they will only be discussed briefly where 468 
relevant. 469 
Manipulation checks. 470 
All manipulation checks were subjected to an ANOVA, with Consistency and Face Validity as 471 
within-participants independent variables, and Endorsement Cue and Order as between-participants 472 
independent variables. 473 
The two checks concerning the extent to which the generated routes matched the way participants 474 
would have planned them themselves (similarity ratings), and the extent of agreement with the 475 
displayed routes both showed highly significant effects of Face Validity, F (1, 32) = 43.8, p < .01, and 476 
F (1, 32) = 36.9, p < .01, respectively. Ratings with regard to the former check were higher in case of 477 
High Face Validity than in case of Low Face Validity (M = 5.46, SD =2.16 versus M = 4.31, SD = 2.23 478 
in the Consistent condition, and M = 4.90, SD = 2.22 versus M = 3.00, SD = 2.34 in the Inconsistent 479 
condition). A similar effect of Face Validity was found on the latter check (M = 5.63, SD = 2.05 versus 480 
M = 4.67, SD = 2.06 in the Consistent condition, and M = 5.29, SD = 2.20 versus M = 3.31, SD = 2.24 481 
in the Inconsistent condition). Both checks, however, also showed an effect of Consistency, F (1, 32) 482 
= 12.4; p < .01, and F (1, 32) = 22.2; p < .01. As can be observed above, both ratings were highest in 483 
the Consistent condition. In addition, a significant interaction between both independent variables was 484 
found on the agreement rating, F (1, 32) = 5.1; p = .03. It appeared that larger differences between 485 
High Face Validity and Low Face Validity were found in the Consistent conditions.  486 
Furthermore, analysis of the Consistency manipulation check showed that participants judged the 487 
process feedback as significantly more predictable in the Consistent condition, compared to the 488 
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Inconsistent condition (M = 6.21, SD = 2.21 versus M = 4.65, SD = 2.36 in the Consistent condition, 489 
and M = 4.88, SD = 2.19 versus M = 2.96, SD = 2.41 in the Inconsistent condition), F (1, 32) = 42.4, p 490 
< .01. Also, a highly significant effect of Face Validity became apparent on this check, F (1, 32) = 491 
56.7, p < .01; predictability was rated higher when process feedback had been high in Face Validity, 492 
versus when Face Validity had been low.  493 
Consistency appeared to have a similar effect on the check to what extent participants had 494 
discerned patterns in the process feedback (M = 6.56, SD = 2.31 versus M = 5.50, SD = 2.40 in the 495 
Consistent condition, and M = 5.88, SD = 1.97 versus M = 4.69, SD = 2.59 in the Inconsistent 496 
condition), F (1, 32) = 7.7, p < .01, as did Face Validity, F (1, 32) = 15.6, p < .01. 497 
Ratings regarding the extent to which they believed fixed rules to underlie system output showed 498 
only a marginally significant effect of Consistency, with higher scores in the Consistent condition, 499 
compared to the Inconsistent condition (M = 6.79, SD = 1.88 versus M = 5.50, SD = 2.13 in the 500 
Consistent condition, and M = 6.06, SD = 1.73 versus M = 5.38, SD = 2.38 in the Inconsistent 501 
condition), F (1, 32) = 3.0, p = .09. The effect of Face Validity, with High Face Validity resulting in 502 
higher scores than Low Face Validity, was significant, F (1, 32) = 11.8, p < .01. 503 
Before and after-interaction trust measures. 504 
The before- and after-interaction trust measures were subjected to ANOVAs, with Consistency and 505 
Face Validity as within-participants independent variables, and Endorsement Cue and Order as 506 
between-participants independent variables. Table 5 and Table 6 display means and standard 507 
deviations of before- and after-interaction trust ratings, respectively. 508 
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Table 5 
Average ratings of system trust, taken before interaction on 7-point 
scales, and standard deviations as a function of Endorsement Cue, 
Consistency, and Face Validity; higher scores indicate higher levels 
of trust 
Face Validity Endorsement Cue 
Consistency  
Consistent  Inconsistent 
M SD  M SD 
High 
Low 3.88 1.23  3.67 1.46 
High 4.96 1.12  4.71 1.16 
Total 4.42 1.29  4.19 1.41 
       
Low 
Low 3.88 0.99  4.21 1.02 
High 4.83 0.96  4.88 0.99 
Total 4.35 1.08  4.54 1.05 
 509 
Table 6 
Average ratings of system trust, taken after interaction on 7-point 
scales, and standard deviations as a function of Endorsement Cue, 
Consistency, and Face Validity; higher scores indicate higher levels 
of trust 
Face Validity Endorsement Cue 
Consistency  
Consistent  Inconsistent 
M SD  M SD 
High 
Low 4.29 1.08  4.54 1.32 
High 4.67 1.43  5.00 1.10 
Total 4.48 1.27  4.77 1.22 
       
Low 
Low 3.71 1.55  1.92 1.06 
High 3.50 1.69  2.38 1.47 
Total 3.60 1.61  2.15 1.29 
 510 
The effect of the Endorsement Cue manipulation significantly affected before-interaction trust 511 
measures, but not the after-interaction measures, F (1, 32) = 15.0; p < .01, and F (1, 32) = 1.4; ns. 512 
Trust was rated higher when a high endorsement cue was given, compared to a low endorsement cue. 513 
Apparently, the manipulations that took place in the interaction stage, i.e., after the before-interaction 514 
trust measure, overruled the effect of the Endorsement Cue. 515 
The after-interaction measures showed a significant main effect of Consistency, F (1, 32) = 22.2; p 516 
< .01, indicating that these ratings were higher in the Consistent than in the Inconsistent conditions. 517 
Manipulations of Face Validity also affected the after-interaction trust measures; these were higher in 518 
the High Face Validity conditions than in the Low Face Validity conditions, as indicated by a 519 
significant main effect of Face Validity, F (1, 32) = 110.7; p < .01. 520 
These results supported the hypotheses. When no other information was available, the endorsement 521 
information was used to build trust, as indicated by the Endorsement Cue effect on the before-522 
24 
interaction trust measures. After the interaction, however, Endorsement Cue no longer showed an 523 
effect on trust, as it was overruled by the competing information conveyed by process feedback. 524 
The interaction of Face Validity and Consistency was significant for the after-interaction trust 525 
measures, F (1, 32) = 29.3; p < .01. Table 6 and Figure 4 show that that the effect of Face Validity was 526 
far smaller when Process Feedback was also consistent, compared to when it was random. The 527 
interaction on the after-interaction measures, however, indicates that Consistency was more influential 528 
than Face Validity. When Process Feedback was consistent, the fact whether it also had High or Low 529 
Face Validity added only little in terms of trust. Face Validity gained in importance in the absence of 530 
consistency, however, arguably as it did not have to compete. 531 
 
Figure 4. Average ratings of system trust, taken before and after interaction on 7-point scales, as a 
function of Endorsement Cue and Consistency; the left part shows averages for High Face Validity, 
the right part for Low Face Validity; higher scores indicate higher levels of trust 
To test the specific hypotheses about the dependence of cue effectiveness on whether Process 532 
Feedback was consistent or random, separate analyses were run for Consistent and Inconsistent 533 
conditions. In the Consistent condition, a highly significant interaction between Time of measurement 534 
and Endorsement Cue was found, F (1, 32) = 11.8; p < .01; as expected, the effect of Endorsement 535 
Cue reached significance only for the before-interaction-, and not the after-interaction measures, F (1, 536 
32) = 18.3; p < .01, and F (1, 32) = 0.1; ns., respectively. A non-significant three-way interaction 537 
between Time of measurement, Endorsement Cue and Face Validity indicated that this effect could 538 
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
5,5
Before After
Sy
st
em
 T
ru
st
 
Low Endorsement Cue, Inconsistent Process Feedback
Low Endorsement Cue, Consistent Process Feedback
High Endorsement Cue, Inconsistent Process Feedback
High Endorsement Cue, Consistent Process Feedback
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
5,5
Before After
25 
not be shown to differ between the High and Low Face Validity conditions, F (1, 32) = 0.5; ns. This 539 
supported the hypothesis that consistent Process Feedback would yield trust-relevant information that 540 
would overrule the competing, less informative Endorsement Cue. 541 
In the Inconsistent condition, the interaction between Time of measurement and Endorsement Cue 542 
was not significant, F (1, 32) = 1.9; ns. Closer inspection revealed a significant Endorsement Cue-543 
effect on the before-interaction-, and a marginally significant effect on the after-interaction measure, F 544 
(1, 32) = 9.4; p < .01, and F (1, 20) = 3.6; p = .07. A non-significant three-way interaction between 545 
Time of measurement, Endorsement Cue and Face Validity suggested this not to differ between High 546 
and Low Face Validity conditions, F (1, 32) = 0.6; ns. Although marginally significant, the after-547 
interaction trust ratings showed an effect of the Endorsement Cue manipulation, which is in 548 
conformance with expectations: as inconsistent Process Feedback would convey only little competing 549 
trust-relevant information, the effect of Endorsement Cue information was expected to affect both 550 
before- and after-interaction measures. 551 
 552 
The Order in which Process Feedback manipulations took place, appeared to interact with 553 
Consistency on the after-interaction trust measures, F (7, 32) = 5.4; p < .01. Subsequent analyses 554 
indicated that after-interaction trust ratings were somewhat higher when participants had encountered 555 
inconsistent Process Feedback first. In addition, the effect of Consistency manipulations on trust 556 
appeared to be strongest when inconsistent preceded consistent routes. Perhaps, when inconsistent 557 
Process Feedback was encountered first, the subsequent consistent routes may have been more easily 558 
recognisable as such, resulting in higher trust ratings following consistent Process Feedback, 559 
compared to when consistent routes were encountered first. 560 
Staked credits. 561 
No significant between-participants main effect of Endorsement Cue was found on the number of 562 
credits staked, F (1, 32) < .1, ns. Consistency only resulted in a marginally significant main effect, F 563 
(1, 32) = 3.7, p = .06. The number of credits staked was slightly higher in the consistent process 564 
feedback condition than in the inconsistent condition (see Table 7). 565 
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Contrarily, a highly significant main effect of Face Validity was found, F (1, 32) = 37.9, p < .01; 566 
high Face Validity caused participants to stake more credits than low Face Validity. 567 
Table 7 
Average number of staked credits and standard deviations as a 
function of Endorsement Cue, Consistency, and Face Validity 
Face Validity Endorsement Cue 
Consistency  
Consistent  Inconsistent 
M SD  M SD 
High 
Low 5.29 1.99  5.25 1.80 
High 5.48 2.21  5.76 2.13 
Total 5.39 2.08  5.50 1.97 
       
Low 
Low 4.75 2.14  3.97 1.97 
High 4.43 2.50  3.70 2.49 
Total 4.59 2.31  3.83 2.22 
 568 
Moreover, Face Validity and Consistency were found to interact significantly, F (1, 32) = 6.3, p = 569 
.02; as is illustrated by Figure 5, in the Consistent conditions, the manipulations of Face Validity 570 
turned out to have a smaller effect than in the Inconsistent condition. 571 
The correlation between the number of staked credits and the system trust ratings was highly 572 
significant, r = .49, p < .01.  573 
 
Figure 5. Average number of staked credits, as a function of Endorsement Cue, 
Consistency, and Face Validity 
Additional analyses. 574 
One could argue that the effect of process feedback is not so much the result of its consistency 575 
conveying information, but rather of its consistency simply being more preferable to users. To address 576 
this potential explanation, a hierarchical regression was conducted in which Consistency, Face 577 
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Validity, and their interaction term were inserted as predictors in the first model, and the agreement 578 
and similarity ratings that were part of the manipulation checks as additional predictors in the second 579 
model; this was done for both after-interaction trust and staked credits as dependent variables. As 580 
Consistency, in contrast to Face Validity, was expected to develop over trials, the staked credits of 581 
only the final (fifth) route-planning trial was inserted as dependent variable. As can be seen in Table 8, 582 
the addition of agreement and similarity to the second model did not at all change the magnitude and 583 
significance of the relationships of Consistency, Face Validity and their interaction with both 584 
dependent variables in the first model. These results, therefore, show that the effects of the 585 
independent variables and their interaction on both after-interaction trust ratings and the number of 586 
staked credits cannot be explained by similarity and agreement ratings. 587 
Table 8 
Results of a hierarchical regression 
 After-interaction trust  Credit staked in 5th trial 
 β t p  β t p 
1. Consistency 0.26 1.41 .16  0.42 1.92 .06 
 Face Validity 0.61 3.30 < .01  0.59 2.70 < .01 
 C x FV 1.13 4.47 < .01  0.94 3.12 < .01 
         
2. Consistency 0.26 1.59 .11  0.45 2.20 .03 
 Face Validity 0.56 3.37 < .01  0.57 2.79 < .01 
 C x FV 0.95 4.16 < .01  0.79 2.82 < .01 
 Similar 0.09 0.73 .47  0.34 2.27 .02 
 Agree 0.31 2.58 .01  0.06 0.41 .68 
 588 
Discussion. 589 
The analyses reported here showed that, in line with previous experiments, endorsement 590 
information affected before-interaction trust levels and its effect on after-interaction trust actually 591 
depended on the nature of the generated routes. Apparently, depending on their nature, the routes 592 
displayed during the interaction stage provided participants with information that overruled the 593 
endorsement effect on the subsequent after-interaction trust ratings. As hypothesised, displayed routes 594 
that were likely to be fast routes (i.e., routes with high face validity), resulted in higher levels of trust 595 
than did routes that were unlikely to be fast (routes with low face validity). In conformance with the 596 
expectations, routes that were consistent were shown to cause higher trust ratings and higher numbers 597 
of staked credits than inconsistent routes. Interestingly, consistency and face validity also appeared to 598 
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interact with one another: face validity proved to have a stronger influence when process feedback was 599 
also random, compared to when it was consistent. 600 
With regard to the relation between cue effectiveness and consistency in process feedback, the 601 
analyses show that, in accordance with the specific hypotheses, consistent process feedback condition 602 
caused the endorsement manipulation to affect only the before-interaction, and not after-interaction 603 
trust levels. In other words, cue effectiveness was shown to be cancelled out over time when process 604 
feedback had been consistent. This effect did not differ between high and low face validity conditions. 605 
Contrarily, in the inconsistent process feedback condition, endorsement cues affected both before- and 606 
after-interaction trust, and this effect was visible in both face validity conditions. 607 
This experiment showed that, besides consistency, face validity of the displayed routes also has an 608 
influence on trust. Process feedback with high face validity, or the displaying of routes that seemed 609 
likely to be fast, matched participants' preconceptions about fast routes, and, thus, influenced trust. 610 
Likely fast routes resulted in higher trust levels than did unlikely fast routes (i.e., process feedback 611 
with low face validity). However, as noted in the above, the magnitude of the effect was determined 612 
by consistency. This could be interpreted as consistency having a higher "priority" than face validity; 613 
it seems as if participants rely more heavily on face validity when consistency is absent. 614 
Lerch and Prietula (1989) reasoned that both agreement and confidence are rooted in predictability, 615 
or consistency, and, hence, are directly related. This explanation, however, fails to explain the 616 
interaction effects found on the after-interaction trust measurement and the number of staked credits. 617 
If predictability, or consistency, and face validity, or agreement, were linked as proposed by Lerch and 618 
Prietula, one would expect these to be additive. In other words, only main effects of these variables on 619 
both trust measures and the number of stakes would have been expected, but not an interaction. 620 
Significant interactions between consistency and face were found, however, indicating that these 621 
variables are not directly related as implied by Lerch and Prietula (1989). A consistent set of routes 622 
could indeed be judged as higher in face validity, but face validity does not necessitate consistency, as 623 
this experiment shows. In other words, consistency may directly influence face validity and trust, but 624 
face validity may also affect trust without consistency. 625 
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Relatedly, one could argue that the effects of process feedback could have more to do with user 626 
possible preferences for routes of a consistent nature than with consistency causing users to infer rules 627 
or information. Unfortunately, no direct measure was available to unequivocally support the proposed 628 
rule-inference mechanism. Nevertheless, the alternative preference explanation is not supported by the 629 
results presented here. Specifically, a hierarchical regression showed that the effects of the 630 
manipulation in this study were not affected by inclusion of measures tapping into participants’ 631 
preferences, indicating that their effects are independent of these preferences.  632 
Study 4: Overall Analysis 633 
An overall analysis was conducted to provide further support for our main point that, despite the 634 
absence of verifiable outcome feedback, the visual process feedback a system provides trust-relevant 635 
information, and that consistency and face validity are instrumental and independent elements in this 636 
feedback. This analysis compared the effects of the various manipulations described in this paper 637 
across experiments 1, 2, and 3, thus allowing us to assess the validity of the focal point with far greater 638 
statistical power. To do so, the experimental conditions that were identical across the experiments 639 
were identified and combined. 640 
 641 
Endorsement information was manipulated similarly across all three experiments, apart from the 642 
fact that in Study 3 manipulations took place between-participants, whereas in Studies 1 and 2 643 
Endorsement was manipulated within-participants. All other variables were manipulated within-644 
participants. Thus, for each participant there are four measurements taken before the interaction (i.e., 645 
one for each of the four route planners), showing only an effect of Endorsement manipulations, and 646 
four measurements taken afterwards, on which the process feedback manipulations had an additional 647 
effect. 648 
The process feedback as manipulated in Study 1 was based on manually planned routes logged in 649 
earlier experiments (De Vries & Midden, 2008; De Vries, Midden & Bouwhuis, 2003) and provided 650 
the basis for the manipulations in Studies 2 and 3; routes in Study 1 and the log file were selected to 651 
create process feedback with a more inconsistent appearance in the one condition, and more consistent 652 
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in the other. The process feedback supplied in Study 1 can therefore be considered to be between the 653 
consistent and inconsistent process feedback conditions of Study 2 in terms of consistency. 654 
In Study 3, an additional characteristic of process feedback was added to the consistent versus 655 
inconsistent appearance of the routes used in Study 2, namely whether the displayed routes were likely 656 
to be fast routes (high face validity) or not (low face validity). In other words, routes were created that 657 
contrasted with the other process feedback manipulations to the degree that they were likely to yield 658 
successful routes; compared to these conditions, the other manipulations, i.e. the available condition in 659 
Study 1 and the consistent and inconsistent conditions in Study 2, can, therefore, be considered to have 660 
high face validity. 661 
Table 9 shows how process feedback conditions of Studies 1, 2, and 3 are combined to form the 662 
conditions in the overall analysis. This analysis comprised levels in which process feedback 663 
Consistency can be unavailable (Absent Process Feedback), inconsistent (Inconsistent Process 664 
Feedback), available and in-between consistent and inconsistent (Available Process Feedback), and 665 
consistent (Consistent Process Feedback). In addition, process feedback can either have High or Low 666 
Face Validity. 667 
As the process feedback manipulations of Study 2 were identical to the manipulations of 668 
Consistency in the High Face Validity condition of Study 3, these conditions can be combined. As 669 
such, the overall design consisted of only six different manipulations of Process Feedback (see Table 670 
9). Taking the two levels of the Endorsement manipulation into account, combining all three 671 
experiments resulted in a design of 12 cells. 672 
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Table 9 
Process feedback conditions in separate experiments compared to those in the overall 
analysis 
  Separate Experiments  Overall Analysis 
Study 1  Absent  Absent Present  Present - High Face Validity 
     
Study 2  Consistent  Consistent - High Face Validity
a
Inconsistent  Inconsistent - High Face Validityb
     
Study 3  
Consistent-High Face Validity   Consistent - High Face Validitya
Inconsistent-High Face Validity  Inconsistent - High Face Validityb
Consistent-Low Face Validity   Consistent - Low Face Validity 
Inconsistent-Low Face Validity  Inconsistent - Low Face Validity 
Note. Indexes a and b indicate identical conditions that are combined in the overall analysis 
Trust measurements taken before interaction depended only on the Endorsement manipulation, on 673 
individual differences in trust, and on within-participant variability. Thus, before-interaction trust (T) 674 
of an individual i after Endorsement manipulation j was modelled as a weighted sum of a fixed 675 
endorsement effect μj, a random variable Ai for individual differences in general trust, and a random 676 
variable Eij for measurement error: 677 
 678 
Tij, before = μj + α*Ai + ηj*Eij,  where A and E ~ N (0, 1). 679 
 680 
Note that the model allowed for different error variances for the two types of endorsement. 681 
Subsequently, both an additive, as well as an interactive model was fitted to these data. The additive 682 
model was used to determine whether there are main effects of Endorsement Cue, Consistency and 683 
Face Validity manipulations, and what the magnitudes of the individual factors' effects are in terms of 684 
trust. Subsequently, comparing the additive and the interactive model with regard to how well each 685 
accounts for the observed means, yields information about interaction effects; if the additive model 686 
would provide a significantly worse fit than the interactive model, this would be an indication of 687 
interactions, providing further support for the results of the experiments. 688 
In the additive model, each level of an experimental manipulation was represented by a constant 689 
that is added to the trust level at the first measurement. Specifically, the after-interaction 690 
measurements were modelled as a sum of the before-interaction measurement in the same 691 
experimental condition, a fixed effect μ for each level of the manipulated factors Consistency (k) and 692 
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Face Validity (l), and again some random measurement error (F) that is uncorrelated across 693 
experimental conditions: 694 
 695 
Tijkl, after = Tij, before + μk + μl + φjkl*Fijkl, where F ~ N (0, 1). 696 
 697 
The additive model as described above is not identified. Whereas the absolute effects of the two 698 
Endorsement manipulations and the effect of the condition in which process feedback was not 699 
available (Study 1) could be estimated without problems, the remaining manipulations of Consistency 700 
and Face Validity required one of the effects to be fixed. It was arbitrarily chosen to set the absolute 701 
effect of the Low Face Validity manipulation to 0. 702 
 703 
The interactive model, in contrast to the additive model, allowed different effects for each of the 12 704 
different experimental conditions. Thus, specific combinations of the three experimental factors may 705 
result in specific levels of trust; no additivity is assumed, except that the after-interaction 706 
measurements are based on the before-interaction level of trust. The modelling therefore only differed 707 
regarding the after-interaction measurements: 708 
 709 
Tijkl, after = Tij, before + μjkl + φjkl*Fijkl,  where F ~ N (0, 1). 710 
 711 
These linear mixed models were fitted to the data using Mx (Neale, Boker, Xie, & Maes, 2003), a 712 
general program that estimates model parameters by maximizing the log-likelihood of the raw data. 713 
Model comparison is done using a likelihood-ratio test. 714 
Results and discussion. 715 
The additive model proved to fit significantly worse than the interactive model, χ2 (7) = 55.5, p < 716 
.01. This indicates that the additive model does not fit the data, and that Endorsement Cue, 717 
Consistency and Face Validity indeed interact.  718 
Figure 6 displays the observed means, and the means as expected under the interactive and additive 719 
models. 720 
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Figure 6. Average observed ratings of system trust, taken after interaction, 
as a function of Endorsement Cue, Consistency, and Face Validity (FV), 
compared to ratings expected by the interactive and additive models 
Based on the additive model, the effect of Endorsement on trust before-interaction turned out 721 
significant; the mean difference between the low and high endorsement cue conditions was M = 1.79 722 
(95% confidence interval: 1.56, 2.02), with higher trust after a high endorsement cue. Absent Process 723 
feedback (Study 1) did not result in changes in trust after interaction, the effect being M = -0.22 (95% 724 
confidence interval: -0.82, 0.32). Available Process Feedback proved to have the same effect on trust 725 
as Inconsistent Process Feedback, the difference between these two conditions being only M = 0.17, 726 
and non-significant (95% confidence interval: -0.30, 0.64). 727 
The difference between Consistent and Inconsistent Process Feedback was significant, M = 0.76 728 
(95% confidence interval: 0.37, 1.14); trust was higher after Consistent than after Inconsistent Process 729 
Feedback. Compared to Available Process Feedback, Consistent Process Feedback resulted in higher 730 
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trust, M = 0.59 (95% confidence interval: 0.13, 1.05). The difference between High and Low Face 731 
Validity was M = 1.84 (95% confidence interval: 1.44, 2.24). 732 
In summary, Available Process Feedback did not differ from Inconsistent Process Feedback. This 733 
supports the assumption made in the discussion of Study 1 about the nature of the displayed routes. 734 
These were argued to be somewhat random, causing participants to rely on the Endorsement 735 
information in order to interpret what they saw on the screen. Moreover, this overall analysis provided 736 
further support for the observation that Consistent Process Feedback resulted in higher trust than 737 
Inconsistent Process Feedback. In addition, Process Feedback with High Face Validity also instilled 738 
more trust in participants than Process Feedback with Low Face Validity. The additive effect of Face 739 
Validity turned out to be far stronger than that of Consistency; the difference between High and Low 740 
Face Validity was far greater than that between Consistent and Inconsistent Process Feedback.  741 
However, care should be taken in interpreting these main effects, since the additive model fitted the 742 
data significantly worse than the interactive model. This indicates that the different manipulations 743 
indeed interacted with each other, as was concluded from the results of the individual experiments. In 744 
line with the findings of Studies 2 and 3, the interactive model suggests that the effect of Endorsement 745 
on the after-interaction trust levels depends on whether process feedback was Consistent or 746 
Inconsistent (see Figure 6). Whereas the additive and interactive model largely agree on the difference 747 
in trust between high and low endorsement cue conditions when process feedback was Random, the 748 
interactive model estimates this difference to be far smaller in the Consistent Process Feedback 749 
conditions. The additive model, however, does not expect a difference in the Endorsement effect 750 
between Consistent and Inconsistent Process Feedback. In addition, the interactive model aligns with 751 
the results of Study 3, suggesting that the effect of Face Validity depends on the consistency of 752 
process feedback; Figure 6 shows that in the Inconsistent conditions the difference in trust between 753 
High and Low Face Validity was greater than in Consistent conditions, in line with what was found in 754 
Study 3. 755 
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General Discussion 756 
The reported studies present a number of interesting phenomena pertaining to situations in which 757 
users of systems have different kinds of information at their disposal. Study 1 showed that cue 758 
effectiveness could be moderated by the availability of process information. When process feedback 759 
was absent, the influence of the cue, given beforehand, diminished over time; when process feedback 760 
was present, trust ratings remained fairly stable over time. Study 2 showed that process feedback with 761 
a random appearance caused a similar pattern of trust ratings as the process feedback. Presumably, 762 
inconsistent process feedback provided rather indefinite visual information that required the content of 763 
the endorsement manipulation for interpretation. Hence, the effect of endorsement information was 764 
present both before and after the interaction stage. Nevertheless, randomised routes also resulted in a 765 
general decrease of trust ratings. Presumably, randomness was taken as a sign of a system's 766 
inadequacy. Consistent process feedback, on the other hand, apparently did provide information on 767 
which trust judgements could subsequently be based; this effect was strong enough to completely 768 
annihilate the effects of endorsement information. 769 
Study 3 provided further support for the conclusions drawn in Study 2. Again, a main effect of 770 
process feedback consistency was found; trust was shown to be higher after consistent rather than 771 
inconsistent process feedback. In addition, the effect of consistency became apparent, for example, 772 
from the interaction with face validity: the effect of the latter factor was stronger when process 773 
feedback was randomised. This could be interpreted as an indication of the "informative content" of 774 
consistent process feedback. Process feedback being consistent may have reduced the need to rely on 775 
other information, i.e. face validity. Randomness would likely have caused participants to put more 776 
emphasis on the face validity of the information. This is conformance with the notion that inconsistent 777 
process feedback, as opposed to consistent, provides little information that can be used to build trust; 778 
specifically, this lack of information apparently caused the face validity of process feedback to gain 779 
weight in trust judgements. 780 
The overall analysis (Study 4) provided additional support for these findings. Whereas the additive 781 
model provides information about the magnitude of the manipulations' independent effects on trust, 782 
the significantly worse fit of this model with the means observed in the three experiments, compared 783 
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to the interactive model, indicates that these data cannot be explained by mere additive effects of the 784 
manipulations. In line with the findings of Studies 2 and 3, the predictions of the interactive model 785 
suggest that the effect of the endorsement manipulation on the after-interaction trust levels depends on 786 
whether consistent or inconsistent process feedback had been encountered. Similarly, the interactive 787 
model also indicates that the effect of face validity depends on the consistency of process feedback, 788 
which is congruent with the results of Study 3.  789 
Furthermore, these results suggest that consistency and face validity of process feedback do not 790 
necessarily represent two sides of the same coin. Whereas Study 2 shows that process feedback 791 
consistency causes trust to increase, Study 3 indicates that agreement with route advice can cause trust 792 
to rise independently of consistency. This finding was supported by the results of the overall analysis, 793 
which also showed independent, additive effects of both process feedback consistency and face 794 
validity, with the size of the latter exceeding that of the former. 795 
The staked credit measure was employed both as a means to increase participants’ task 796 
commitment and as an alternative trust measure. The willingness to stake credits on the outcome of the 797 
automatic route-planning mode implies a willingness to be vulnerable to its actions, and, as such is a 798 
reflection of their trust in the system (cf. Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). Nevertheless, the effects 799 
of endorsement and process feedback found in the trust measures did not always materialize on the 800 
number of credits. As argued before, a possible explanation lies in the nature and timing of the various 801 
manipulations. Whereas endorsement cues were administered before interaction with each route 802 
planner, it could well have affected the credits staked in the all trials, especially the first few, and the 803 
same goes for face validity of process feedback. Process feedback consistency, however, could only be 804 
assessed after at least a number of trials, and its effect on later trials may have been compensated by 805 
the lack of effect on the first. In light of these considerations, however, it is noteworthy that the 806 
average number of staked credit correlated quite reasonably with after-interaction trust ratings in 807 
studies 2 and 3. In addition, these two measures showed the same pattern of results in the additional 808 
analyses in Study 3, showing that the effects of the independent variables on both could not be 809 
explained by similarity and agreement ratings. We therefore regard the staking of credits as a 810 
worthwhile addition to both these studies and future research into system trust. 811 
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 812 
These findings shed new light on the assumption that indirect information is easily overruled by 813 
direct information (Yuliver-Gavish, 2011; Arion et al., 1994), for instance, because of the latter's 814 
higher informational content (Arion et al., 1994). Indeed, process feedback, as a type of direct 815 
information that is not accompanied by right/wrong outcome feedback, is capable of overruling 816 
indirect information. Whether or not direct experiences provide more information than indirect 817 
experiences, however, seems to depend in part on the nature of the former. As Study 2 suggests, if 818 
process feedback is consistent, it may indeed overrule the less informative indirect information. The 819 
manipulation checks of Study 2 revealed that participants, according to expectation, expressed a 820 
stronger belief that the system's output was governed by fixed rules when process feedback had been 821 
consistent compared to when it had been random. This provides some support for the notion that 822 
consistency facilitates the formation of beliefs about the system's functioning. The manipulation 823 
checks of Study 3, however, only showed a mere trend in this direction. Furthermore, these data seem 824 
to indicate that in the case of inconsistent feedback indirect information is actually necessary for 825 
interpretation; the data of Studies 2 and 3 clearly showed that this particular combination of direct and 826 
indirect information resulted in persistence, rather than extinction of the effect of endorsement 827 
information. A further indication that inconsistent feedback required users to call upon other 828 
information available was found in the greater influence of face validity on trust in the inconsistent 829 
conditions. 830 
An alternative explanation would hold that, rather than fostering a sense of understanding, the 831 
system’s behaviour should be seen as either conforming or disproving prior expectations. Merritt and 832 
Ilgen (2008) showed that users’ trust before interaction, i.c. their propensity to trust, influenced how 833 
the system’s objective characteristics were perceived, and that the resultant perceptions of these 834 
characteristics influenced post-task trust. They argued that trust prior to interaction created 835 
expectations for system performance, and that the effect of performance on after-interaction trust 836 
would depend on the correspondence between performance and expectations. Indeed, they found that 837 
high performance resulted in high trust ratings when propensity to trust was also high, and vice versa; 838 
contrarily, no effect of performance was found when propensity to trust was low. In the studies 839 
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reported here initial trust, i.e., trust prior to interaction, was not incorporated by measuring trust 840 
propensity but rather by manipulating endorsement cues. Nevertheless, our results could be seen as 841 
congruous with Merritt and Ilgen’s in underscoring the importance of perceptions of behaviour, rather 842 
than objective behaviour, and the interaction of behaviour with initial trust. 843 
Our results differ from Merritt and Ilgen’s (2008), however, in the nature of the interaction. If 844 
randomised, as opposed to consistent, process feedback is assumed to be a sign of a system's 845 
inadequacy, and the results of studies 2 and 3 support this assumption, then their explanation would 846 
imply that consistent process feedback after a high endorsement cue would result in the highest trust 847 
levels, and randomised process feedback after a low endorsement cue in the lowest. The after-848 
interaction trust levels in studies 2 and 3, however, deviate from this pattern. For instance, in Study 2, 849 
low endorsement with consistent process feedback resulted in ratings similar to high endorsement and 850 
consistent process feedback. In Study 3, the combination of high endorsement and consistent process 851 
feedback did not result in trust ratings exceeding those in other conditions, regardless of face validity. 852 
In addition, the number of staked credits shows that when process feedback was consistent, neither 853 
congruence nor incongruence with expectations created by endorsement cues mattered much, if 854 
anything. Process feedback either confirming of contradicting expectations can therefore not 855 
sufficiently explain these results. 856 
Additionally, one could argue that the interaction of endorsement cues with process feedback could 857 
be explained by a low endorsement cue evoking a certain alertness, causing participants to watch 858 
system behaviour more closely. Thus, manipulations of consistent versus inconsistent process 859 
feedback may only affect trust levels when preceded by a low endorsement cue, as seems to be the 860 
case in the after-interaction trust measures in Study 2. Indeed, there is ample evidence to suggest that 861 
negative information weighs more heavily in decisions and evaluations (for instance, see Rozin & 862 
Royzman, 2001). However, if a minority cue, as opposed to a majority cue, would indeed cause 863 
alertness, this would also have resulted in interactions of consensus with process feedback on the 864 
checks in studies 2 and 3. However, such interactions could not be shown for any of these checks. 865 
Moreover, the pattern of results found in Study 3 are as much the result of changes in the consistent as 866 
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in the inconsistent process feedback conditions, after both low and high endorsement cues, and as such 867 
contradict this alternative explanation. 868 
 869 
The concept of process feedback, and its possible beneficial effects on a user's understanding of 870 
system functioning has received only scant attention, since it has found its way into theories on system 871 
trust a few decades ago (e.g., see Lee & Moray, 1992; 1988). Although Dzindolet et al. (2003) tested 872 
the effects of understanding of a system's processes on trust, the emergence of understanding from 873 
actually observing process feedback remained obscured. Therefore, these experiments represent a first 874 
attempt at uncovering how process feedback plays a role in the development of system trust, via 875 
understanding. 876 
For practitioners in the field of user-system interaction, user-system design or software engineering 877 
these findings have a number of ramifications. For instance, our results suggest that it is important to 878 
not only develop software and hardware that performs as it should, but also to take into account how 879 
their advice to the user comes about, and to communicate this to users – especially for novice users. 880 
Moreover, we would like to point out that findings such as these, rather than complicate practitioners’ 881 
work, offer new possibilities to optimise user-system interaction. Specifically, the notion that direct 882 
experience with systems has more facets than previously imagined causes the calibration of system 883 
trust to no longer be a mere matter of designing for perfect user advice, but also of designing for 884 
transparency (cf. De Visser et al. 2014; Helldin et al., 2013; Ososky et al., 2014; Thill, Hemeren, & 885 
Nilsson, 2014). Everything a system “does” may cause users to wonder about what happens inside the 886 
black box that technology often is, and factors as consistency and face validity may offer new ways to 887 
guide this process, and thus novice users’ trust in the optimal direction. 888 
Much work needs to be done to fully uncover all trust-relevant aspects of direct information. Since 889 
interactions with systems normally entail both outcome as well as process feedback, it seems 890 
worthwhile to study not only the former, which yields feedback in clear right/wrong verdicts, but also 891 
the latter, that may contain far subtler clues and is subject to interpretation. To fully understand users' 892 
perceptions of, and interactions with systems, what matters is not just what these systems do, but also 893 
how they do it. 894 
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 895 
Key points: 896 
 Direct experience with technology is generally considered important for building users’ trust, but 897 
research is limited to the effects of system output, i.e. the system either yielding accurate of 898 
correct solutions or not. 899 
 In the absence of direct experience, novice users are assumed to base their trust solely on indirect 900 
information, such as the opinions of other users. 901 
 Research reported here shows that direct experience may also be obtained from interacting with 902 
the system, i.e. a route planner, even though concrete, verifiable system output (i.e., right or wrong 903 
routing advice) is absent. 904 
 Consistency in process feedback, i.e., the routes suggested by the system, may enable users to 905 
make inferences about its underlying processes, and thus increase trust. 906 
 Consistent, as opposed to random, process feedback overrules the effect of indirect information on 907 
trust of the user in the system.  908 
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